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Feminist ethics is a relatively new arrival on the philosophical scene. Thinking 
about the significance of gender in our conduct and institutions i hardly new, 
but it is only fairly recently that philosophers in large numbers have begun to 
Incorporate such thinking into their investiga tions of the nature of ethics. 
On hearing that such a thing as "feminist eth ics" exists, people are often-
and understandably-puzzled as to what sort of enterprise it could be. After all , 
they think, ethics is ethics, and whatever ethical theories and standards turn out 
to be most rationally defensible, they will presumably be so for everyone alike. 
Are feminist ethicists suggesting that some different ethical standard or ideal exists 
for women-or for feminists? 
This puzzlement is entirely reasonable and the issue it raises absolutely 
central. In my view, the core of feminism as an ethical and political position is 
the endorsement of a single standard of human freedom and dignity for every-
one, regardless of gender. 1 To make this standard a social reality, however-
Instead of just a nice idea that we carry around in our heads-we must come to 
understand what kinds of systems and behaviors undermine it and what theories 
and assumptions support and underlie those systems and behaviors. We need a 
SUbstantive standard of human freedom and dignity, a clear view of what stands 
?~tween it and us, and a conception of what is required to bring us closer to real-
IZll1g it. In a world still rigidly structured by gender discrimination, this requires 
both a feminist analysis of society and an approach to ethical philosophy that takes 
seriously the influences of gender bias. 
This chapter begins with a description of the core tenets of feminism 
along with some brief support for the most controversial of these. I'll then explain 
how a male gender bias has pervaded much of philosophical ethics and 
summerize two different (although related) approaches to remedying that bias: 
(eminine ethics and feminist ethics. I will argue that feminine ethics alone is 
ll1adequate to the task described above, and that feminist ethics incorporates 
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1 f I: " I ' h'l ' 1" t' peri lous the important insig ltS 0 lemmme ehlcs w I e avOiC Illg Its some Imes 
deficiencies, 
• WHAT IS FEMINISM? 
Although contemporary feminism is diverse and many faceted, it is nonetheles} 
possible to characterize briefly its core tenets, You may well find one or more °d 
these claims con troversial; my aim just now, however, is not so much to defen 
their h'uth as to clarify what is being sa id, which is often, as here, the first concern 
of philosophers, 
• Core Tenets of Feminism 
Feminism begins with the claim that: 
1, Women and men are rational and moral equals, 
With respect to the basic rational and moral capacities that define personho~d, 
neither gender is naturally or inherently inferior to the other. To endorse clal]l1 
1 does not require denying that there are differences between men and WOIll~;~ 
with respect to their predominant psychological traits and dispositions; as we WI _ 
see, feminists differ about the existence and extent of such gender-based differ 
I ' I b ' The ences and, per laps more Important y, a out their origins and their meanIngs, I 
import of claim 1 is that, however alike or different, men and women are equa 
in human dignity and worth and as such are entitled to equal concern and respect, 
Such equal concern and respect requires granting to both men and wOIllen 
a full and equal complerr~ent of rights, To ensure equal social and civil sta~~~ 
t~ese rights must be effectIve, that IS, actually respected, rather than merely the 
CIally gran ted , Accordmg to the second major tenet of feminism, however, 
reali ty is guite otherwise: 
2, Women and men are not currently social and political equals, Gender inequ:Ji:S 
eXISts, 111 most If not all societies, and this inequality systematically cli sadvanl g 
women , 
Tak~n together, tenets 1, and 2 ~ortray a d~sconnec t belween an enduring Ill: rf~ 
realI ty and a se t of pre,vaIllllg SOCial and political circumstances: a group of pe ~h' 
that IS I,n fact equal III human dlgmty ,and worth is not being h'eated as su 
Recoglllzlllg tl1lS disconnect naturally Yields the conclusion that: 
3, Cencier inequali ty is unjust and should be ended, 
• Distinguishing Feminists from Nonfeminists 
Ol:e virtue of th'e conception of fel~inism just outlined is that it helps u S ?i,st~~­
glllsh femllllsts from nonfemlllists III ways that are both helpful and intultlV Y 
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plausible. In particular, it enables us to ee that fem inism requires the acceptance 
of both claims 1 and 2 and the consequen t recognition (as in claim 3) of pre-
vailing conditions as unjust. 
. It is common to mistake the acceptance of tenet 1 alone for feminism, that 
IS, to think that feminism is simply a matter of believing in the inherent equality 
of men and women. The belief that women are just as worthy and competent as 
men, and that they are thus entitled to equality, is certainly important and valu-
able; however, it does not yet arti culate a feminist position. For if one also believes 
that men and women are now socially and politica lly equal-for instance, that 
women have fully overcome any disadvantages or obstacles that may have 
Impeded them in the past and now enjoy the equality that they deserve-then 
One's pos ition is not feminist. Feminism is an oppositional and critical politics, to 
which the recognition of curren t injusti ce is essential. It is for this reason that 
feminism's aim is to make itself obsolete. 
It is also possible (although less easily mistaken for feminism) to accept claim 
2 without accepting claim 1. For instance, one might believe that gender inequal-
Ity ex ists and that it disadvantages women but that because women are naturally 
l11ferior to men, that is, are not men's rational and moral equals, the social inequal-
Ity between men and women is just, fair, and appropriate. Thus proponents of 
tl~l s position wi ll , in light of their rejection of claim 1, also reject claim 3. (It is 
cIifficult, these days, to get away with openly articulating this position, at least in 
mixed company. As a result, we see individuals and organizations publicly defend-
I11g positions of dubious coherence: the Southern Baptist Conference, for 
exampl e, recently asserted that women should submit to their husbands' leader-
ship and refrain from preaching in public, wh il e in the sa me breath declaring 
that men and women are "equal."2) 
. Finally, note that one could accept that systema ti c and unjust gender inequal-
Ity curren tly exists, but hold that it is men rather than women who are disadvan-
taged by it. This position is advanced by many proponents of the "men's rights" 
Or "masculist" movement. 
• WHY FEMINISM? 
Although there are certainly those who reject claim 1, many debates and mis-
ll~derstandings between feminists and nonfeminists concern the acceptance or 
rejection of claim 2, that is, of the claim that women now lack social and politi-
cal equality. Some people deny claim 2 outright; many others contend that, 
although women in many areas of the world are still seriously disadvantaged, 
wOmen in the United States and other Western industrial democracies have suc-
ceeded in gaining equali ty. 
Although it is not my primary task to defend the truth of the core feminist 
tenets above, offering some support for tenet 2 wi ll aid further discus ion by clar-
Ifying Some of what is at issue. To this end, let me discuss just t\,yo important areas 
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in which women (including U.S. women) are now seri ously di sadvan taged by 
gender inequali ty: the areas of work and of vulnerabili ty to violence. 
• Women's Work: Separate and Unequal 
You may have heard it sa id before that women tend to receive less money for 
doing the same work as men and that women face a form of discrimination in 
promoti on known as the "glass ceiling." T hese cla ims are true and important, but 
far more significant in affec ting masses of women is what we might call the "s ticky 
floor" - the fact that in almost any fi eld , women line the bottom. Women fa ce 
segregation into low-paying and low-prestige "women's work" - largely service 
occupati ons such as clerical support, nursing, teaching, home health , day ca re, 
and elder care. T hat there are many exceptions to this rule, and that the segre-
ga ti on is not legally enforced, does not alter its detrimental effec ts on the lives of 
most women. 
This means that ge tting less money for the same work is, although impor-
tant, the leas t of most women 's problems because, in most cases, women are not 
doing the same work as men, and the work that they do is undervalued and under-
paid because they are women. Jobs requiring similar levels of education and train-
ing are valued and rewarded differently depending on whether they are performed 
primarily by men or primarily by women. 3 The issue is not so much whether a 
female child-care worker or construction worker makes as much as a male child-
ca re worker or cons truction worker but, instead, why most child-care workers are 
female and most construction workers male and why construction workers make 
more money than chi ld-care workers do. 
Finally, whether or not women work outside the home for pay, they continue 
to bear a disproportionate responsibili ty for domesti c labor - the maintenance of 
households and the ca re of children, elders, and other dependents. Al though 
recent decades have seen some increase in men's participation in these duti es, 
the inc rease is substantially less than one might hope, and the time women spend 
on such labor (aga in, even when they also work outside the home) still far exceeds 
that spent by men . T his has led some feminists to refer to wom en's domesti c labor 
as the "second shift."4 T his labor, of course, is not paid at all , and too often is not 
even recognized as real work, especially when it is done by poor women receiv-
ing government assistance. Such unpaid labor by wom en (or indeed by anyone) 
is not counted as part of any country's gross domestic product, thus resulti ng in 
dangerously skewed portrayals of economic reali ty.5 
• Violence and Terror in Women's Lives 
Most of us, from time to time, have heard recitals of grim and shocking sta tistics 
abou t the incidence of rape, battering, sexual harassment, and other forms of 
sexual violence and exploitati on in the lives of women and girls. That these sta-
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tistics vary in their details should not blind us to their underlying agreement: that 
male violence against women is both exceedingly common and drama tically 
underreported. We know, fo r instance, that women and girls are raped in all kinds 
of circumstances-by dates, by husbands and boyfriends, by fathers and step-
fathers, by bosses and coworkers, as well as (less frequently) by men who are 
strangers to them. In a recent survey of 16,000 Americans, jointly sponsored by 
the National Institute of Justi ce and the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, 18 percent of women reported having been victims of rape or attempted 
rape at some poin t in their lives 6 G irls and young women are especially vulner-
able to sexual assault: the same study showed that 54 percent of rape victims were 
under the age of eighteen when they were first raped. Among women who had 
been raped or phys ically assa ulted after th e age of eighteen, 76 percent were 
attacked by a curren t or form er husband, cohabiting partner, or date. Fi nally, it 
is important to remember that many women suffer multiple inciden ts of sexual 
violence during their lives: among women who reported having been raped within 
the twelve months prior to the survey, the average number of rapes per woman 
during that twelve-month period was 2.9. 
Thirty yea rs of feminist critique and activism have brought about important 
and necessary changes in the law, in preva iling attitudes toward thesc abuses, and 
in the services available to their victims. It is important to remember, however, 
that the primary feminist aim in this area is to reduce the actual incidence of these 
abuses, and ultimately to end them entirely. The goal of feminism is to bring 
about equality, and equality requires that this damaging and discriminatory 
burden in the lives of women be removed, not merely that more of its perpetra-
tors be punished or its victims treated better in the aftermath. Unfortunately, no 
evidence shows that women and gi rls are being raped, ba ttered, and sexually 
harassed any less frequently now than ten or thirty yea rs ago; the devastation 
wrought in women's lives by these abuses continues unabated. 
One might rea onably wonder whether these abuses of women are correctly 
thought of as an element of gender inequality; as terrible as they are (one might 
say), they do not affect all women, but only those who are their victims. Femi-
nists have argued, however, that thi s complex amalgam of abuses harms all 
women and girls in our culture . This is so in a number of ways; I'll discuss just 
one, namely, that women and girls live their daily lives in fear of violence. We 
are taught that male violence against women is a natural and inevitable feature 
of the social environment and that women can avoid such violence only by con-
trolling their own behavior in certain rigidly specified ways.7 The result is that 
women have less freedom than do men: to walk alone at night, to go on dates 
without fear of assault, to drink a bit too much at a party, to work late in a deserted 
office~ to dress as they please, to drive across the country alone, and to sleep with 
the wlI1dow open, to name just a few. Although no law forbids these actions, our 
culture teaches that women who do such things put themselves in danger. Too 
~ften, the implication is that any subsequent attacks on them are their own fault: 
What was she doing there, anyway?" 
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• The Concept of Oppression 
T he fea tures of women's lives just described are among many that provide evi-
dence for claim 2 above- that women are not currently the social and political 
equals of men. Far from being aridly legalistic, claim 2 addresses matters close to 
the center of our lives as men and as women: what work we do, wha t burdens we 
must bear, what dangers we face inside and outside our key relationships, and 
what resources are ava ilable to us to lead the lives that we want to lead . Further-
more, these matters involve some of our most fundamental rights as human 
beings: the right to bodily safety and integrity, the right to freedom of movement 
and freedom from terror, the right to work, and the right to the resources neces-
sary to ma intain a decent life for oneself and one's dependents. 
To a id in understanding of these matters, feminists have employed a concept 
that has been important in liberation movements of many kinds: the con cept of 
oppression. Our claim has been that women are an oppressed group. Although 
the con cept of oppression has been defined in different ways, most theorists agree 
that oppress ion is much more than the sum of inten tional acts of discrimina tion 
by bigoted individuals. According to Marilyn Frye's influen tial definition, oppres-
sion is a "system of interrelated barriers and forces wh ich reduce, immobilize, and 
mold people who belong to a certain group, and effec t their subordination to 
another group."s 
Because of the complex and systemati c nature of wom en's oppression, its 
roots and consequences, like those of other forms of oppression, are not always 
immediately apparent. Instead, elem ents of gender oppression li e buried in many 
of our least questioned assumptions about our lives and in many of our most 
widely accepted practices. According to som e femin ists, such elements also lie 
buried, and som etimes not so buried , in the assumptions and practices of philo-
sophical e thi cs. 
• ANDROCENTRISM IN PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 
T he field of academic philosophy, histori cally male dominated, has in recent 
decades seen an influx of more women into its ranks. It has become apparent to 
many such wom en (and to a number of male philosophers as well ) that much of 
th e hi story of philosophy, including that of philosophical ethi cs, is male biased, 
or androcen tric. Why thi s would be so is not difficult to understand. T he works 
constituting that history were written almost entirely by m en - mostly privileged 
and powerful ones, although not without exception-during historical periods 
when educa tion , freedom of movement, and the production of cultural and intel-
lec tual work were largely off-limits for wom en. 
This point, although neither mysterious nor especially complex, is enor-
mously important. It reveals that, however tempting it may be to view the history 
of philosophy as the con tinuing effort of human beings to understand themselves 
and their place in the universe, this history is in fact almost entirely the effort of 
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(again, mostly privileged) men to understand themselves and their place in the 
universe. Following are several ways in which thi s androcentrism has expressed 
itself in the history of philosophical ethics. 
• Female Invisibility 
Perhaps the mos t pervas ive express ion of androcentrism in philosophical ethics 
has been its tendency to ignore women outright. Whatever the generi c uses of 
the pronoun "he" may or may not be in contemporary discourse, for the authors 
of most hi stori cal works of philosophy "he" meant exac tly what it sa id: the moral 
agen t, the hero , the soldier, the citi zen, the man of virtue, are all explicitly and 
unself-consciously conceived as male. In these texts, for the most part, moral 
deliberation is something that takes place within the minds or souls of individual 
m ales, and communal moral life is the life that men lead in the company of other 
men. For this reason, female students reading these undeniably important works 
often find that they have to try to "read themselves into" the texts; given the texts' 
frequent omission of women's very existence, let alone of women's perspec tives 
or rol es in the moral communi ty, this is not always an easy thing to do. T his form 
of androcentrism, while clea rly a product of women's oppress ion, also contributes 
to that oppression by conveying that the lives, concerns, and choices of women 
are so unimportan t as to be beneath mention. 
• Overt Misogyny 
Where wom en have come to the a ttention of ethical philosophers, that attention 
has usually been unfavorable: women have often been the ob jects of overt 
misogyny. (Notable exceptions to this rule include Plato [427-347 B.c .J -at least 
in The Republic-and, centuries later, the strongly feminist John Stuart M ill 
[1806-1873:1-) From side comments to extended analyses, wha t philosophers have 
had to say on the subjec t of women -concerning their nature, value, and proper 
roles-has by and large ranged from mocking to vi cious. 
Aristotl e (384-322 B.C.) and Ka nt (1724-1804), arguably the two grea test 
e thical theorists in the history of philosophy, are particularly notorious for their 
sexism . (I will have more to say about Kant shortly.) Feminist philosopher Cynthia 
Freeland helpfully summarizes some of Aristotle's views on the subj ect of women: 
"Aristotl e says that the courage of a man lies in commanding, a woman 's lies in 
obeying; that 'matter yearns for form , as the female for the male and the ugly for 
the beautiful' ... that a female is an incomplete male or 'as it were, a deformi ty', 
which contributes only matter and not form to the generation of offspring; that 
in general 'a woman is perhaps an inferior being' ; tl1at female charac ters in a 
tragedy will be inappropriate if they are too brave or too clever."g To Aristotle, the 
conclusion was clea r: "the male is by nature superior, and the female inferi or; 
and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to 
all mankind."lo 
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Once we notice invisibility and expressions of misogyny in the history of 
ethics, it is possible to respond in various ways. One response is to ask whether 
such authors as Aristotle and Kant can be legitimately blamed for their attitudes 
toward women and for the expression of those attitudes in their philosophical 
works, that is, whether given their historical and cultural circumstances, they 
could and should have done better.)) Although this is a worthwhile line of inquiry, 
feminist philosophers have typically been more interested in whether and how 
these authors' misogyny relates to other elements of their own theories and 
(relatedly) in whether that misogyny has filtered down through the tradition to 
be picked up and reflected in some of our con temporary moral assumptions, 
theories, and practices. 
An optimistic response to these questions, while acknowl edging that it is 
wrong to exclude or vilify women, would contend that these features of histori-
cal texts do not bear on the overall value or truth of the theories they present. 
That is, one might say that although these authors should have included women 
in their theories on equal terms with men, their failure to do so does not bear on 
the fundamental worth of their theori es. According to this approach, we should 
simply ignore these theorists' false beliefs about women, .read their theories as if 
they had meant them to apply to women too, and evaluate other elements of their 
views independently of their misogynist beliefs and assumptions. 
There is certainly something to this approach. That a theorist expresses con-
tempt for women does not invalidate his views on a wide range of subjects, and 
we benefit from studying the works of undeniably great ethical philosophers such 
as Kant and Aristotle regardless of their opinions about women. The assumption 
that their misogyny has no bearing on the rest of their theories, however, is open 
to question. There is at least one important way in which female invisibili ty and 
misogyny combine to underwrite some fundamental and continuing assumptions 
in the history of ethics. 
• The Male Standard in Ethical Theory 
One central task of ethical theory is to articulate and defend a human ideal, that 
is, to identify the defining features of an ideally good human life. It is in contrast 
to this ideal, or standard, that deviations or failures can be recognized as such. As 
we pursue the task of defining such an ideal, however-as with most tasks of any 
importance-various forms of bias and blindness tend to infect our perceptions. 
With this in mind, many feminist philosophers have charged tha t what passes for 
a human ideal in much of standard philosophical ethics is in fact a male ideal. 
Imagine opening a medical textbook and seeing, under the heading "The 
Human Body," a drawing of the body of an adult male. When you ask where yoU 
might find a drawing and explanation of female anatomy, you are told that yOLl 
need a different book, for this information is to be found in a special subdisci-
pline of medicine, that of obstetrics/gynecology. Nothing negative has been said 
about women; the message is simply that the male body "stands in" for the human 
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body unmodified, and the fe male body is special and different- different, that is, 
from the standard set by the male body. 
Something qu ite similar can occur in ethical theory and, according to fem-
inist ethicists, frequently has. The tendency is to look at men to see how they 
approach moral life: what they see as ethically relevant decisions, how they make 
those decisions, and what they think is involved in making those dec isions well. 
(Recall, aga in, that men have historically been not only the objects of such inquiry 
In t also its subjects- the ones doing the inquiring, often including introspectively 
inqui ring into their own psyches.) What is observed of men, or considered to be 
ideal for men, is then elevated to be the standard for human beings in general: 
"man" comes to stand in for "moral agent" and "good man" for "good person," 
in much the way that the male body stands in for the human body in the earlier 
e:cample. Men are taken as the paradigm of humani ty, and a male point of view 
is disguised as a universal or objective point of view. As Su an Sherwin puts it, 
",nen have constructed ethics in their own psychological image."12 
Aga in, nothing nega tive has yet been sa id about women, at least not explic-
itly. In fact, however, invisibility and misogyny have already made their appear-
ance: when women's experiences, perspectives, and prac tices are considered 
irrelevant to the task of defining a human ideal, the assumption that women are 
inferior and unimportant is already firmly in place. This assumption is then rein-
fo rced when, with our "human" (male) standard in hand, wc eventually do look 
a: women and fi nd that they differ from that standard . 
We all know that men and women differ anatomically. However, when a male 
slanda rd of human anatomy is in place, it is hardly surprising that various aspec ts 
of female biology come to be pathologized, that is, treated as devian t, problem-
a:ic, and indicative of sickness and malfunction. Many health care profess ionals 
of both sexes have made valiant efforts to combat this tendency, but the male stan-
dard is still influential in our society's medical treatment of women: our medical 
e;tablishment markets powerful antidepressant drugs to women with premen-
slrual symptoms, trea ts childbirth as a dangerous process routinely requiring 
edensive technological intervention, and pressures postmenopausal women in to 
taking hormones fo r the rest of their lives. 13 
A male standard in ethical theory has similar implications. Aga in, to the 
edent that women are thought to deviate from the standard set by men, women 
are judged to be defective. We can see this pattern most clearly, aga in, by looking 
to a historical example. Kant famously argued that moral duties are "categorical," 
that is, binding on us irrespective of what we happen to desire. He also argued 
that one's actions have no true moral worth unless they are performed "from the 
nlOtive of du ty," tha t is, unless one does the right thing not because one wants 
to, but because one recognizes that a universally applicable moral principle (the 
ca tegorical imperative) requires it. 14 In this context, consider Kant's views on the 
nature and capacities of women: "Women will avoid the wicked not because it is 
unright, but only because it is ugly .. . nothing of duty, nothing of compulsion, 
noth ing of obliga tion! . . . They do something only because it pleases them .. . I 
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hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of principles."15 According to Kant, then, 
the very form of thought and action that constitutes moral life itself is a form of 
which women are incapable. 
It is important for us to understand what has happened h ere (and in many 
structurally similar cases) . It could be one of two things. Kant might have deter-
mined on independent grounds that a certain form of thought and action is con-
stitutive of moral life and then discovered that, as a matter of empirical fact, 
women are not capable of that form of thought and action. Alternatively, he might 
have assumed from the outset that whatever it is women do and think is by defi-
nition not a part of morality proper. According to the second interpretation, the 
assumption abou t women comes first, and the conception of morality is built 
aro und it; women are locked out of this moral framework not simply empirically 
but also conceptually and a priori. 
It is difficult to say which of these interpretations is closer to the truth. Most 
likely, Kant's beliefs about the nature of women developed as part of a cornplex 
interplay with his beliefs about the nature of morality. The cen tral task for femi-
nist ethicists, however, is not so much to discern what went on in Kant's h ead but 
instcad, to investigate whether and how some forms of moral theory may hav~ 
shut women ou t conceptually (instead of, or in addition to, shutting thern out 
empirically) and, if so, how such conceptual error affects these theories' concl u-
sions. We need to take seriously the possibility that male bias can lead us into 
error not simply about women (although such error is important in its own right) 
but also about morality itself. 
• Implications of the Male Standard 
A theory that adopts a male standard says essentially this: women and mell. 
. . . are 
different, and manhood IS the standard or Ideal from which WOmen deviate. A 
frequent corollary of such a theory is that there are in fact. separate and distinct 
Ideals, or vlltues, appropna te for men and women respectively. Aga in, Arist tl 
provides an illustration: he believed that the virtues of free men are those a 0 e 
priate to full citi zenship and political activity, while those of "free" (that I' ppro, 
I ) 1 . . d l 'l ' nOn .... save wO
l 
n;en ~re t lose appropnate to servltu e, suc 1 as Sl ence and obedience. 
Althoug 1 lew 111 contemporary U.S. socIety would openly defend this view £; 
inists have observed parallels to it in many of our ordinary judgments abou~ e1
n1 
.... 
. "I: .." " 1' " b I . A " W"lat:: 
conshtlutes] prope,; c lemll1111e v~rsus mascu ll1e e 1aVIOr. good [prOperl,! 
mascu ll1e man, lor ll1stance, IS strong, courageous, assertive, rational ad' I 
control , and a "good [properly feminine 1 woman" is quiet, nurturing, de~el~~e lfJ. 
and compliant. nt, 
Such gender-based standards, although clearly in flux and often veiled . 1 
than explicitly expressed, have many important con equences in th r~~ "lee 
of women and men. Most obviollsly, both women and men are often ~ dIve::; 
harshly and penalized for perceived deviations from the standards dIll ged. 
appropriate for their sex. A woman may be labeled pushy, aggressive Or" ebe.rned. 
. ' a Itch" 
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for behavior that would be deemed admirably asser tive in a man, while a man 
may be derided as wimpy, weak, or "womanish" when he expresses vulnerability 
In a way that would be seen as natural or appropriate in a woman. Whenever 
Such double standards are applicd , their inherent gender bias must be examined 
and criticized. 
The consequences for women of a male-biased standard, however, have an 
additional and extremely important dimension. Whenever there are differen t 
Ideals for men and women, and the male ideal is taken to be the paradigm of 
humanity itself, the result for women is a pervasive and damaging double bind. 16 
As mentioned above, to the extent that a woman approximates the male standard, 
she is defective as a woman : insuffi ciently feminine, mannish , a freak, a bitch. 
Granted, she can be judged a "good woman" by conforming fully to the female 
standard, that is, to norms of femininity. We must remember, however, that on 
this model, womanhood itself is a defective, lesser form of humanity. It thus 
appears that, whenever a male standard is in place, a woman can be either an 
ideally good woman or an ideally good person- but not both. 
• The Male Standard, Revised and Updated 
It is worth briefly noting two ways in which one might modify the picture that 
I've drawn so far. F irst, one might claim that women really are just like men after 
all, that is, that women do conform to the male standard and that any suggestion 
to the contrary is a wholly unfounded stereotype. Alternatively, one might 
argue that, although women have by and large fallen short of the male standard, 
this hortfall is owing not to women's nature but to the unjust constraints that 
have been placed on women's development and activities. For instance, one 
might say, if attention to abstract principles were as encouraged and rewarded in 
women as in men, then women would in fact draw closer to this aspec t of the 
human ideal. 
These views arc certainly improvemen ts, in that neither depicts women as 
naturall y and irredeemably defec tive. They do, however, leave in place the sub-
stance of the standard previously deemed male. That is, the qualities previously 
thought appropriate for men are now thought to be the qualities appropriate for 
humans in general. It may be, however, that in adopting this standard as the 
human ideal, we risk losing or disregarding something of great value. Many fem-
inists have argued, in fact, that it is the substance of the male standard that is 
limited and biased, not merely the assumption that only men can or should 
embody that standard . 
• FEMININE ETHICS: CHALLENGING 
ANDROCENTRlSM 
Challenging androcentri sm in philosophical ethics requires that we bring women 
fully into the picture-and that we do so without the inherently misogynist 
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assumption that maleness sets the standard for humanity. That is, ethical theo-
rizing must be undertaken in full recognition of core feminist tenet 1 above: that 
women and men are moral and rational equals. Incorporating tenet 1 requires 
that we take women seriously as moral agents: how do women understand them-
selves, perceive the world, and think about moral questions? What do women 
think is important and valuable in human life? Philosophical ethics must embody 
and express respect for women as human equals by devoting attention to and 
understanding women's points of view. 
The next question, of course, is "What are women's points of view?" And the 
answer, of course, is that they are many and diverse- there is no single "female" 
or "feminine" way of thinking (about morality or anything else), let alone any 
single set of be1iefs and values embraced by all women. But it has seemed to many 
people (feminist, nonfeminist, and antifeminist alike) that there are-at least 
within particular cultures, if not across them -some very general patterns of diver-
gence between the moral perspectives of men and women. (After all, if no such 
gendered differences exist, then the male standard in ethical theory will be of 
Ii ttle practical consequence.) 
The first central claim of "feminine ethics," then, is an empirical one: that 
the typical or predominant moral perspectives of women and men, respectively, 
are different. (A weaker version of this claim would be that, given the historical 
tendency to ignore and vilify women, it is at least necessary to investigate whether 
such a difference exists and, if so, what it means.) This empirical claim can be, 
and has been, assessed in different ways, both through formal research (most often 
conducted by psychologists) and by the kind of careful and attentive reflection 
on our own social experience by which we evaluate empirical claims of many 
kinds. 
The second claim central to feminine ethics is a normative one: that women's 
differences from men in the moral realm-whatever and however extensive these 
differences may be-should not be assumed to be deficiencies, any more than 
men's differences from women should be assumed to be deficiencies. Within the 
historical context that I've outlined, this claim is revolutionary, for it upsets the 
basic assumption of the male as standard. In recent decades, this conceptual shift 
away from taking the male as standard has reverberated across many academic 
fields, not to mention within the personal lives of many women and men. 
• Gilligan's Ethics of Care 
Much philosophical work in feminine ethics has been inspired and influenced 
by the research of Carol Gilligan. Although Gilligan is an educational psycholo-
gist, not a philosopher, her observations about patterns of difference between male 
and female ethical styles (or "voices") have contributed much to philosophers' 
efforts to begin taking women's moral perception and reasoning seriously.17 
Gilligan began developing her distinctive research program during the 1970s, 
largely ~s an outgrowth of and response to her work with Lawrence Kohlberg, 
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another influential psychological researcher. On the bas is of his own studies, 
Kohlberg had outlined six distinct "stages" of moral development through which 
people pass in their (often incomplete) journeys to moral maturityI8 The idea is 
that, at each successive stage, one has different (and better) sorts of reasons for 
conforming to moral constraints as one understands them. Kohlberg's stages are 
as follows: 
Stage 1: Punishment and Reward. For instance, a child refrains from hitting her little 
brother to avoid a "time-out" or to get a cookie. 
Stage 2: Limited Reciprocity. A child shares his own toys in hopes that his playmate 
will share hers with him. 
Stage 3: Social Approval. A teenager behaves according to prevailing norms so that 
others will approve of her. This is sometimes called the "good boy-nice girl" 
orientation. 
Stage 4: Law and Order. A person behaves out of a sense of duty to respect authority 
and main tain the prevailing social order-and out of an accompanying desire 
to be respected as an upstanding member of society. 
Stage 5: Social Contract. Here one conforms to sociely's rules in the belief that those 
rules regulate people's behavior in ways that allow each to pursue his own inter-
ests wi thout undue interference from others, thus benefiting each in the long 
run. 
Stage 6: Universal Principles . Here one understands and assesses one's own behavior 
by reference to universal ethical principles (such as justice, reciprocity, equality, 
and respect) that are thought of as self-legislated and as independent of the moral 
codes of one's own (or any) particular society. 
Using this scale, Kohlberg set out to assess the level of moral development 
of his research ubjects. In his interviews, Kohlberg asked people to respond to a 
series of fi ctional moral dilemmas. One of these dilemmas, later used by Gilligan 
in one of her studies, is now famously known as the Heinz dilemma. The story 
goes like thi s: Heinz's wife is dying, and her life can be saved only by adminis-
tering a certain very expensive drug, which Heinz cannot afford to buy. The 
druggist, although aware of the situation's urgency, refuses to lower the price of 
the drug. Respondents were asked what Heinz should do under the circum-
stances-for instance, whether he should steal the drug-and why. Their level of 
!noral development was assessed on the basis not of what answer they gave, but 
of what kinds of reasons and considerations they brought to bear in favor of their 
answer. 
Using his six-stage scale, Kohlberg assessed tl1e moral development of many 
people from variolls cultures, nations, races, and walks of life. All of his initial 
subjects, however, had one characteristic in common: they were all male. Fur-
thermore, when Kohlberg's instrument was eventually administered to females, 
the results were striking: females tended to score a full level lower on Kohlberg's 
scale than did their male counterparts. This was partly because female respon-
dents tended to look for solutions to Heinz's dilemma that would pre erve con-
nections betwecn the various parties. For instance, some sugge ted that Heinz and 
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the druggist keep negotiating and agree on a payment plan. O ne young girl 
pointed out that if Heinz were to steal the drug, then he might go to jail, and 
then what if his wife needed more of the drug later? In light of this worry, she 
concluded that Heinz and his wife "should really just talk it out and find some 
other way to make the money."19 
Note that this young girl 's response resists a simple either-or solution and also 
avoids a strict priority ranking of the relevant values (for instan ce, of life over 
money or of one person 's ri ghts over another's) . Instead, she emphasizes that this 
particular event takes place within a nenvork of relationships that extends over 
time, and she seems to put highest priority on maintaining those relationships 
and trying to get people's needs met within them . Such a response is difficult to 
assess using Kohlberg's scale. T he temptation , however, is to place answers like 
this at stage three, that is, to see them as concerned with approval and with being 
a "good girl." Thus it was that, when Kohlberg's scale was applied, many female 
respondents appeared to be "stuck" at stage three, wh ile many males ascended to 
stages four and five . 
T he gender difference in these re ults seemed to indicate one of two things: 
either females are less morally developed than males or there is something skewed 
abou t the standards that Kohlberg was using to measure moral development. As 
we now know, the former is a historically familiar idea . G ill igan, properly wa ry 
of its implica ti ons, undertook her own research and interviewed both males and 
females about their responses to e thical dilemmas (both real and imagined). 
Based on this resea rch, she argued that there are two distinct moral "voices," or 
ways of th inking about and responding to ethical questions, loosely assoc iated with 
women and men respec tively. G illigan called these the ethics of care (or respon-
sibil ity) and the ethics of justi ce (or rights). 
T hese tvo moral voices differ in their core themes and values and in the 
kinds of considerations that they take to be most relevant to reachi ng good moral 
decisions. T he justice perspective begins with a conception of persons as separate 
individuals. T hese separate individuals need common rules to govern their inter-
actions with each other; a primary function of these rules is to safeguard a realm 
of autonomy within which each individual may operate without undue interfe r-
ence from others. Thus, central to this perspective is the notion of individual 
rights, which are the same for everyone and must be respected fa irly and impar-
tially. Moral decision making is a matter of adjudicating conflicts betveen rights 
and of seeing to it that one's actions conform to abstract and universal codes of 
conduct. According to Gilligan, the justice perspective is more prominent in the 
moral voices of males than in those of females . 
The care perspective, in contrast, begins with a conception of persons as 
embedded in social relationships, in which they bear different and som etimes 
conflicting responsibilities to each other. Here, the priority is on creating and pre-
serving such connections between people and on avoiding and ending people's 
suffering. One's duty is to care about and promote people's well-being, and one's 
responsibility is to respond to the needs of individuals located in concrete, par-
Feminist Ethics 141 
ticular situations-often by strengthening the relationships that support those 
individuals. Gilligan found that the care perspective is expressed most promi-
nently and most frequently by women and girls. 
Many have found Gilligan's picture intuitively plausible, at least in its broad 
outlines. It seems to describe a difference that we can see operating in our own 
social experience as (and among) women and men. Moreover, it is not diffi-
cult to imagine why there might be substantial differences between men's and 
women's moral perspectives. For men and women, by and large, lead different 
kinds of lives. 
• Gendered Responsibilities 
Whether or not women and men are naturally or inevitably different, what is 
certain is that women and men encounter the social world differently. This is 
because that world is structured by a gendered division oflabor, in which women 
and men are assigned different responsibilities. As Marilyn Friedman puts it, "the 
tasks of governing, regulating social order, and managing other 'public' institu-
tions have been monopolized by men as their privileged domain, and the tasks 
of susta ining privatized personal relationships have been imposed on, or left to, 
women."zo More concretely, women are assigned responsibility for the care of 
homes, children, and people's intimate emotional and physical needs (such as 
nurturance, food, cleanliness, clothing, and the like). Even where women work 
outside the home for pay, as is common in contemporary U.S. culture, we can 
see the influence of this traditional division of labor: women are overrepresented 
in fields such as nursing, day care, elementary education, maid service, and food 
service. Both inside and outside the home, tending to the intimate needs of others 
tends to be, both in cultural conception and in actual fact, "women's work." 
The gendered division of labor is more rigid in some cultures and time 
periods than in others; furthermore, there is some cross-cultural variance in what 
the gender-specific roles and responsibilities are. Nonetheless, that people's 
assigned activi ti es differ by gender is far less variant. One gender-specific respon-
sibili ty that has drawn the atten tion of a number of philosophers interested in 
women's moral lives is that of mothering. Having primary responsibility for the 
Intimate care and nurturing of children seems likely to shape women's moral per-
spectives in especially deep and pervasive ways. 
In any case, it seems plausible to suppose that people's ways of thinking are 
shaped significantly by what they spend their time doing, with and for whom, gov-
erned by what norms and expectations, and so on. Thus, it should not surprise 
Us if men's and women's approaches to many things, including moral reasoning, 
turn out to be different. Whether or not a particular gendered division of labor is 
appropriate, necessary, or just, the patterns of moral reasoning and response that 
emerge from and support women's labor are important and complex. Under-
standing and evaluating these patterns is crucial to a full understanding of moral-
Ity and is the primary aim of feminine ethics. 
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• THREE CHALLENGES TO FEMININE ETHICS 
It is a measure of the importance of Gilligan's work that it has been challenged 
in a number of way£ that can deepen our understanding of the issues it raises. We 
can imagine feminine ethics being criticized from at least three different .Fet"-
spectives . T he first is that of the social scientist, whose primary concern IS to \ 
describe the social world correctly and to interpret correctly what we observe of 
that world . The second critical perspective is that of the moral philosopher, whose 
concerns are (among others) to understand correctly the theoretical tradition of 
are reasonable, complete, and useful. The third perspective is that of the ferni-
which he or she is a part and to develop theoretical approaches to morali ty that \ 
nist, whose aim is to understand a system of gender-based oppression in orde~ to 
undermine that system and replace it with som ething better. Although separating 
these three sets of concerns is useful for organizing our thoughts on the matte!", 
a fully adequate approach to the relevant issues must take into account the insight5 
drawn from all three critical perspectives. 
• Empirical Complications 
From an empirical point of view, one obvious question is whether Gilligan 1s 
correct to associate the justi.ce and care perspectives in any significant way with 
gender. A number of questions have been raised about Gilligan's empirical :;It-
tributions of these two moral "voices" to m en and women, respectively. 
Gilligan herself has repeatedly emphasized that the connections she dra.vvs 
to gender are loose and admit of many exceptions; h er position has never been 
that all women employ only the care perspective and all men only the justice per-
spective. Many people show some fluency in both "voices." Interestingly, however, 
Gilligan's research suggests that women are more likely to be ethically bilingtJal 
in t~is way t~lan are men. As Rosemarie Tong points out, "Gilligan stresses tl,at 
unlike today s women who speak the moral language of justi ce and rights l1e:;l rly 
as fluently as the moral language of care and relationship, today's boys and -c(J-en 
remain largely unable to articulate their moral Concerns in anything other ttJan 
the moral language of justice and rights."zl 
G iven the complexity and multiple layers of people's moral discourse .______let 
alone of the beliefs, values, and assumptions that underlie that discourse- :i t IS 
perhaps wise that, in muc~l of her later work, G illigan has adopted the langv~ge 
of "focus."zz A person of either gender who is perfec tly capable of understanomg 
and discussing moral questions from both persI)ectives tl 1 s1 OW a 
may never le ess ~ 
preference for, or focus on, one or the other, perhaps somewhat like being !":ight-
or left-handed. 
Even given these important qualifications how eve [. ~ain 
.. , . . . ' r, some concerns eJ-'" 
about Gilligan s empmcal conclusIOns. I will ment'o . ttl ems. 
1 n JUs wo SUC 1 cone 
First, Gilligan's studies were conducted on a relatively 11 1 l ost oj 
. 1 . lb ' sma sca e, anc 11., her subjects were peop e Wltl su stanbal educ·~tional "1 1'] ·t. c; rea· 
c c pnVI ege. lUS, I l'" 
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sonable to wonder to what extent her results, including the gender distribution of 
moral "voices" that she observed in her research sample, can be extrapolated to 
the U.S. population as a whole (let alone to humanily in general). In fairness , 
Cilligan has never claimed that such extrapolation is justified, and she empha-
sizcs that hcr ma in interest is less in the gender distribution of the "voices" than 
In the relati on of these voices to each other and in what each brings to our moral 
consciousness . Still, it will be important for anyone who is interested in the gender 
distribution to take seriously the limitations of G illigan's research sample. 
The second empirical concern has to do with the nature of the research 
rather than the extent of the sample. In short, it is one thing to analyze people's 
self-reported moral perspectives on (mostly) imaginary situations, and another 
thing to observe how they actually behave in their lives. Although the former kind 
of inquiry yields interesting information, the latter kind seems at least equally 
Important to a full understanding of gender differences in morality. We need not 
criticize G illigan for pursuing one kind rather than the other, but we can and 
should seek out other kinds of information about gender differences in moral 
beliefs and behavior. 
DOing so may in turn provide further insight into the nature of the two per-
spectives G illigan identified. For instance, many studies have shown a persi tent 
gender gap in people's attitudes toward war, patriotism, and nationalism; in hort, 
111en's nationalistic sentiments, and their enthusiasm for particular wars based on 
those sen timents, tend to be more fervent and pronounced than women's. 23 In 
one sense, this gender gap bears out G illigan's view that women tend to adopt 
more "caring" responses-here, supporting negotiation and reconciliation over 
armed confli ct. This evidence also challenges an aspect of G illigan's view, 
however, for in this case the typically feminine position displays a more univer-
sal consciousness, whereas the typically masculine position is more parochial in 
Its tendency to valorize and privilege one's own particular nation. 
Such issues of interpretation are just as important to evaluating Gilligan's 
work as are more stra ightforwardly empirical questions. Jean Grimshaw, for 
Instance, has questioned whether the justice perspective is inherently more 
focused on principle than is the care perspective H It might be, she says, that 
persons adopting the care perspective are equally "principled," but their princi-
ples simply endorse different priority rankings. For instance, rather than seeing a 
lack of principle in some of the typically feminine responses to the Heinz 
~ilemma, we might instead see them as implicitly endorsing a principle like this: 
Seek the preservation of a relationship over the immediate assertion of your own 
rights." Carrying out such translations, in both directions, may help assauge the 
uneasy sense that these two moral perspectives are wholly incommensurable . 
• A Bifurcated Moral System? 
The last point raises a question that looms large in philosophical discussions of 
C illigan's work and its implications, namely, once we have recognized these two 
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different perspectives on morality (regardless of their gender distribution), what 
are we to do with them? 
One approach is to eleva te one perspective, that is, to endorse one ~s mor~ 
fundamental, complete, and central to a proper understanding of morali ty tha 
the other. Another approach is to allow the two perspec tives to stand as separate, 
and perhaps to some degree as competing, emphases in our moral lives, One 
version of the latter approach resolves the apparent tension between the two 
perspectives by assigning them to different spheres of moral life: the justIce 
perspective properly governs us in public life (governmental and business 1I1ter-
actions, for instance), and the care perspective is app~opria te for our privat,e ar:r 
intImate mterac tlOns (as WIth fnends, lovers, and fa mIlies) , Such a bIfurcatIOn ) 
our moral lives, however, is inadvisable, Public pursuits such as internatlOna 
diplomacy stand to benefit from a foc us on mending and maintaining relatIOn-
ships, and as feminists have tirelessly pointed out, considerations of justice must 
be brought to bear even in our most intimate relationships, , 
A third approach is to try to integrate aspects of both "voices" into one u!1lfied 
h " ' I I Jltl-moral perspective, t at IS, mto a smg e analyti cal framework within whic 1 1m 
pIe goods can be both fully understood and appropriately valued, I believe that 
this is a worthy goal, but achieving it will require articulating carefull y what IS 
being sought. For the best answer to the question "What do women want ill , 1 
moral theory?" (asked by Annette Baier in the title of her well-known artic1 e)25 IS 
that most women, and most men as well , do not want a moral theory at all , That 
is to say, most people neither employ nor seek a moral theory, at least if moral 
theory is ,understood as a matter of reducing the complexity of moral life to; 
smgle ultImate good or to a smgle pnnclple for the regulation of conduct. Instea , 
what most of us want is, a store of moral concepts that clea rly articulate wha t we 
value and that usefully Illummate the choices we face, , 
Many of our moral concepts, as we currently understand them, find theIr 
natural hom e m one or the other of the two perspec tives that Gilligan observed ~ 
autonomy an ~1 respect 111 the )US~lCe perspective, for instance, and compasslOle 
and empathy m the care perspectIve, Furthermore, it is difficult to see how thos 
two perspectives, as they stand, can be integrated, Gilligan expresses this difficul~ 
m some of her later work, companng the shift between the two moral perspec 
bves to our perception of ambiguous figures (for instance the drawing that can 
be seen either as a vase or as a human face)Z6 For OUI' ,1' ts to be ideally 
mora concep ) r 
useful to us, however, they must be able to take tIle ' I I 'de each ot le 
, Ir p ace a ongsl C I 
within a single m?ral perspective- they must be such that we can see them, anC 
th e realities they Illummate, fully and clea rly wI'tl1 t f 
' C one se 0 eyes, 
The project of developmg such a Coherellt set f t 1st be under-
" , 0 concep s ml taken III concert With a further analytical step UTe t' tl fac t that, as 
" ' " , VV I can no Ignore ' le 
they stand, the two moral VOIces and their key c t roclLlcts of an 
, . oncep 's are p ,[£' '_ oppreSSIve sys tem, a system that con tructs mell ad ' ly as dll!el 
, , en WOmen not SImp c I e 
ent, but as domlI1ant and suborehnate, We need t I I 'about tl 
, I f I " ' " 0 une erstanc mOle , e locatIOn and ro e 0 eac 1 VOIce (and its assocl'a ted ) 'tl ' OIJpresslV 
concepts WI 1m 
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systems and their ideologies. At this analytical juncture, feminin e ethics begins 
to fall short. '10 help us revise our moral concepts to fit within a unified moral 
perspective, fe minine ethics must be integrated into a wider frame of analysis-
that provided by feminist ethics, and by feminism more generally. 
• What about Oppression? 
Despite its admirable focus on taking women's moral perspectives seriously, femi-
nine ethics as such has little to say about oppression. It might, of course, point to 
historical and contemporary gender inequality in explaining the tendency not 
to take women seriously, but once a feminine moral perspective is identified, 
oppression ceases to playa cen tral role in the analysisY Again, the emphasis of 
feminine ethics is on core fem inist tenet I-that women and men are rational 
and moral equals. A feminist approach, in contrast, incorporates both tenets I 
and 2-that is to say, it recognizes that women and men are rational and moral 
equals whose lives are bound up together within an oppressive system of gender 
lI1equa Ii ty. 
Aga in, gender oppression (like other forms of oppression) is not just an accu-
mulation of hostile or irrational acts; it is a system that perpetuates itself in many 
ways, including by inculcating genderecl ideals of what it means to be a "good 
woman" or a "good man." Whether or not we like this system, we are its 
creatures; our perspectives and concepts, moral and otherwise, are formed sig-
nificantly in conformity with its ideologies and with the roles and re ponsibilities 
to which it assigns us-roles and responsibilities that are not only different 
but unequal. Recognizing this fact, and its implications, is necessary if we are to 
use the actual moral perspectives of women and men as informative bases either 
for challenging oppression or for developing a fully coherent set of moral 
concepts. 
• FROM FEMININE ETHICS TO FEMINIST ETHICS 
Within both the justice perspective and the care perspective lie important con-
ceptual resources for challenging oppression of all kinds. Concepts such as 
jUstice, equality, autonomy, and respect for individual rights provide a vital basis 
for feminist and other challenges to entrenched systems of oppression. Such chal-
lenges are also motivated and sustained by a desire to alleviate suffering and to 
promote and preserve valuable human connections. A critical feminist approach , 
rather than abandoning any of these vital concepts, examines how they become 
distorted so as to serve rather than undermine an oppressive system. 
• Toward Integration: Care, Respect, and Autonomy 
~aring labor is vital to sustaining any human society, let alone any worth living 
In. We all depend on trusting connections with others to meet our emotional, 
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physical, and spiritual needs, and inevitably the most vulnerable memb;rs 0: 
society, for instance, chddren and the severely disabled, depend on others car 
without being able to offer similar care in return. People who routinely perform 
such cari ng labor must become skilled at perceiving people's needs, attentiv~ly 
responding to those needs, and establishing and preserving the relationslllPs 
within which those needs can continue to be met. These skills are among the 
most worthy and necessary to which human beings can aspire. 
In oppressive systems, however, the caring labor that sustains individuals and 
communities is not equally or justly distributed. Specifically, the oppressed grOUP 
is typically charged with tending to others' needs, both those of the oppressor 
group and those of vulnerable dependents. Certainly this has been the pattern In 
systems of gender oppression. 28 Women's caring skills, then, are the skills of ~i1; 
oppressed group that has been charged with the responsibility of serving othe rs 
needs from a position oflittle power or authority and whose survival has depended 
on doing this well. 
One conclusion we can draw is that women's facility at caring, although valu-
able and necessary, risks reinforcing gender oppression by rendering women bod1 
very able and very willing to fulfill their assigned function within an oppressive 
division oflabor. Under conditions of oppression, women's tendency to see them-
selves primarily as responders to others' needs may perpetuate a system that ke~Ps 
women in positions of service to others. Catharine MacKinnon has put this critI-
cism succinctly, if a bit harshly: "Women's moral reasoning is ... what f11ale 
supremacy has attributed to women for its own use ... . Women are sa id to val ue 
care. Perhaps women value care because men have valued women acco rding to 
I h · ,,29 t l e care t ey give. 
In this context, uncritically embrac ing "care ethics" can be harmful to 
women, both individually and collecti.vely, by rendering them dangerously vul: 
nerable to explOltahon: Women who fall to rell1m th.elr ca ring may maintain reI a 
tionships at all costs (mcludmg to themselves), aVOid legitimate self-assertiofl to 
keep the peace, devote their energies to others at the expense of self-develop111eflt, 
and protect even those others whose behavior is abusive or exploitative. A nLlrfl ber 
of writers on feminine ethics have addressed these risks· indeed GI·ll· llerself 
, , Igan . ~rgues that t~ e final stage of moral development within the care perspectl~e 
IJ1volves comll1g to care for oneself and others, conSidered as a relational tJfllt. 
Although includ~ng oneself among those one cares for is valuable as far as it gOes, 
a fully Viable ethiC of care must go farther. It must reveal mode of life that subject 
anyone to exploitation as falling short, I:Ot only of true justice but also of trUe 
caring. By addressing when carIng IS and IS not appropriate-by wh J: 11 0 )11, 
d I J:. • I· om, lor W f when, an w ly-a len1JJllSt ana YSlS moves us toward a differen t conceptiofl 0 
caring itself. 
Feminist ethicist Robin Dillon, in her analysis of What she calls "c9re 
respect" I)rovides a model of the sort of conceptual revisiOIl I a e fl d-
, . em recomI11 
ing. Although care and respect are typically understood a Core t f the 
. . . .. concep SO 
care and Justice per pectIves, respectIvely, Ddlon argues that the two conceFts 
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are intimately connected, that indeed, "a closer consideration of respect shows 
that caring for another is a way of respec ting her." As Dillon observes, "recog-
nizing the connection ben",een care and respect may provide the basis for a more 
integrative approach to moraJity."3o 
To respect someth ing, Dillon argues, is to recognize and respond appropri-
ately to its value. What counts as an appropriate response to something's value 
depends on what the features of the thing are that make it valuable. Respect for 
IJersons as such, then, involves recognizing and responding appropriately to the 
"morally significant fea tures of persons," by which Dillon means "those features 
that make something a person and make persons things that must morally be 
taken account of."31 Our understanding of respect for persons, then, depends on 
what fea tures of persons we consider to be morally significant. 
Dillon contends that the Kantian tradition in moral theory (the influence of 
which looms large in the justice perspective) has taken an overly limited view of 
what the morally significant features of persons are, resulting in a correspondingly 
hmited understanding of what respect for persons involves. According to the 
Kantian tradition, the distinctive value of persons lies in a capaci ty that all persons 
have in common - the capacity to ac t according to principle. 32 As we have seen, 
the justi ce perspective emphas izes respecting each person's autonomy, under-
stood a their right to choose and act free from undue interference. 
As Dillon points out, however, other voices- both within the mainstream 
philosophical tradition and especially within the newly emerging ethics of 
care-have emphasized additional fea tures of persons as morally significant. 
~mong these fea tures are the following: that persons are specific, concrete, and 
unrepea table" individuals; that each person has her own way of perceiving 
and understanding the world and herself; and that each person has needs 
and wants that she cannot satisfy on her own. Respecting a person, then, involves 
more than refraining from interfering with her. It also involves responding to 
her as the particular individual that she is, attempting to understand and 
enter into her perspective, perceiving her wants and needs, and trying to address 
them. 
"Care respect" is the sort of respect that emerges from this broadened con-
ception of the morally significant fea tures of persons. Although Dillon's analysis 
does not foreground relationship and connection in quite the explicit way that 
Gilligan's care perspec tive does, it seems clear that care respect for others is best 
enacted within ongoing relationships of trust and mutuality. Furthermore, the 
concept of care respect can also help us to understand how true caring precludes 
exploi tation. In short, having care respect for oneself rules out the kind of self-
abandonment that is often involved in excess ive and lInreciprocated service to 
others.13 
In redefining caring labor as both respectful and worthy of respect, we chal-
lenge both the tendency to devalue caring labor and the closely related tendency 
to enshrine such labor as culturally feminine. Despite many changes in gender 
relations in the last few decades, and notwithstanding the existence of notable 
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exceptions, evidence indica tes that men as a group are still largely res istant to 
joining equally in the everyday labor of intimate ca re for others, that is, in s~ch 
tasks as changing diapers, caring for elders, sending gree ting cards, vacuumJDg 
the house, and folding th e laundry. Indifference to and incapac ity for such carin g 
labor has been a hallmark of male privilege. 
Although changing this unfair distribution of labor is not a task for theory 
alone, femin~s t. ethics can aga in contribute by redefining a concept tha t (acf cording to C tlligan) IS central to the moral perspec tives of many men _ that 0 
autonomy . Just as our conceptions of ca ring may be. distorted in the servi c~ 
of oppresS IOn, so too can autonomy be mlsl1l1derstood 111 ways that obscure a.n 
thus perpetuate oppressive gender relations. Aga in , autonomy within the jus tICe 
perspective is often understood as a kind of ideal of elf-suffi ciency and , relatedly, 
as aright to be "let alone." T he ideal of autonomy so un;~ers tood , howevcr, mask} 
a hidden dependence on (often female) canng labor. Such a conception 0 
autonomy is most available to those who depend on the caring labor of others 
without having to acknowledge or rec iprocate it. Beginning to value prop erlY 
such caring labor will in turn enable us to redefine au tonomy, both a5 a )1 
ideal and as a right, in ways that take full account of human vulnerabili ty a)1d 
interdependence . 
• CONCLUSION 
In my view, feminist ethics subsumes and transforms feminine e thics . Feminist 
ethics is not an ethics embraced by women, but an ethics embraced by femin ists~ 
that IS, by persons (female and male) who both value men and women as equa l 
and recognize that ge~der oppression c ~nrently hinders th eir rela ting as equals. ~ 
have argued that while taking women s moral views seriously is an importa)1 
first step, we must also take seriously the oppress ive context within which bot~l 
women and men develop their moral perspectives and make thcir moral decI~ 
sions. As Rosemarie Tong puts it, "a feminist approach to ethics asks ( uestiofl:5 
about power- that is, about domination and subordination _even ~efore It 
asks questions about good and evil , ca re and justice, or maternal and Jaten191 
th o k' ,,35 I In Ing . 
Analyz ing moral concepts within the context of oppression h elps us be ttef 
understand both the oppression and the concept , so that the la tte r m ay be refi ned 
and the former undermined. We should recast our moral concepts, where nec~ 
essary, so that they do not depend for theIr meaning and force on tl tual})! 
I . . f " I I I 1e mU e exc uSlve perspec tives 0 Justi ce anc care t 1a t, at east in their IJrese t r "ri5 
. . '. n [Orn15," 
from oppress Ive gender relatIOns. O ur phtlosophlcal efforts to (lev I fu llY 
. e op more 
adequate moral concepts must occur alongs ide, and as ]Jart of Ollr ff t J1der~ 
. , e or s to u 
stand and challenge oppressive systems that preclude both true' t' d trU e 
. . . JUS Ice an d 
caring. Because we are creatures of the oppress ive systems in which ]' _a)1. 
o~ those systems' ideologies-feminist ethics is, in the end, inseparab%e fr:~1 feJ11l' 
111St poltttcs . 
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17. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theol), and Women's 
Develof)ment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 198Z). 
18. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Psychology of Moral Development: The Nature and 
Validity of Moral Stages (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984). 
19. Gilliga n, Of) . cit., Z8. 
ZO.Marilyn Friedman, "Beyond Caring: The De-Moralization of Gender" in 
Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 
1995),64. 
21. Rosemarie Tong, "Feminist Ethics," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosop hy 
(Fall ZOOl Edition), eel. Edward N. Zalta: htll)://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fal1Z00 1l 
en tri es/feminism-eth ics/. 
ZZ. Sce Carol Gill igan, "Moral Ori entation and Moral Development" in Virginia 
lleld, eel. , Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview Press, 1995). 
Z3. Sce N. W. Gallagher, "The Gender Gap in Popular Attitudes Toward the Use of 
Force" in Howes and Stevenson, eds., Women and the Use of Mi litary Force (Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynnc Reiner Publishers, 1993). 
Z4. Jean Grimshaw, "The Idea of a Female Ethic" in Rachel , ed. , The Right Th i ng 
to Do: Basic Readings in Moral PhiloSOf)hy (Boston: McGraw-llill Coll ege, 1999),89. 
Z5 . Anne tte Baier, "What Do Women Want in a Moral Theory?" in her Moral 
Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Cambridge: Harvard Univers ity Press, 1994). 
Z6. See Gilligan, "Moral Orientation and Moral Development," op. cit. 
27. Many theorists whose work emphasizes feminine ethics, including G illigan 
herself, do show some awarene s of oppressIOn. Thus the dIVIde between feminine a nd 
feminist ethics, although analyti cally useful, is to some degree artificial. My contention is 
that to the extent that one's analys is "stops at" feminine ethi cs withou t integrating it into a 
broader feminist analys is, one risks undermining two key tasks - the practi cal task of endin~ 
oppreSSIOn, and the theoretIcal task of arhculatlllg valuable human Idea ls within an inte~ 
grated moral theory. 
Z8 . Caring labor is also disproportionately ass igned to people of subordinated races 
as, for instance, when white southerners relied on black house slaves and servants fo; 
warmth , compassion , and nurturing, as well as for domestic (and in the case of slave: 
women, often sexual ) service. See Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought (New Y~rk: 
Routl edge, Chapman, and Hall , 1991). 
Z9. Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambrid e: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 51. g 
30 .. Robin Dill?n, "Care and Respect" in ~ole and Coultrap-McQui nn, e ds., 
Exf)loratlOns 111 Fem1171st EtllIcs: Theory and Practice (Bloomlllgton : Indiana U11' 'k! IversllJ Press, 199Z), 69. 
31. Ibid. , 7Z. 
3Z. As we have seen, Kant himself did not believe that this capacity was shared b If 
humans; contemporary Kantians, however, rejec t this aspect of his view. ya 
33 . A full er discussion of excessive scrvice to others, and its implications for lfl 0 
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(Fall 2001 Edilion ), ed . Edward N. Zalla: htl:p:llplato.stanford .edu/archives/faIl20011 
en tries/fcm i n ism-cth i csl. 
• QUESTIONS 
I. In what ways does the author seem to agree with Timmons's view (expressed in 
Chapter 6) of the aims of moral theory? In what ways does she secm to disagree with 
his view? 
2. Do you agree with the author's cha racteri zation of the core tenets of feminism? Why 
or why not? C iven her characte ri za tion, are you a fem inist? Why or why not? 
3. Kohlberg's theory accords the highest leve l of moral development to those whose 
mora l thinking emphasizes universal ethical principl es such as justice, equali ty, and 
respecl. Does this seem correct to you? Why or why not? 
4. In what ways does your experience bear out, or fai l to bear out, Gilligan' contention 
that men tend to employ the "justi ce" perspec tive and women the "care" perspective 
when thinking about ethical questions? 
5. Is either of the two moral "voice" described by Gilligan more cen tral to your own 
moral thinking than thc other? If so, is it the voice that Gilligan would say is most 
typical for pcople of your gender? 
6. Given what you know of Kantian deontology, do you th ink that Kant's androccntrism 
and misogyny is fully separable from the rest of his moral theory, or is il plausible to 
suppose that the theory as a whole incorporate a ma le bias? 
7. Given the three moral th eori es outlined in Chapter 6- uti li tarianism, Kantian deont-
ology, and li mited moral plural ism-which, if any, seems most conducive to incor-
porating the insights of fcm inine ethics? of feminist ethics? 
8. The author con tends that many of our cullural norms governing fema le and male 
behavior- in the workplace, in the home, as parenls, as spouses, as citi zens-tend to 
perpetuate and support oppression. Do you agree? If so, which norms and why? If 
not, why not? 
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